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Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.73009045
EAN num: 9780195174472
ISBN number: 019517447X
Label: Oxford University Press, USA
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 512
Printing Date: June 23, 2005
Publishing house: Oxford University Press, USA
Sale Popularity Level: 200210
Studio: Oxford University Press, USA
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When Strategies of Containment was very first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles 'New Look,' the Kennedy-Johnson 'flexible response' strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbechev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end.
He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.
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Rated by buyers -
John Lewis Gaddis is probably the foremost historian of the Cold War.
Strategies of Containment provides a complete basic overview of the subject of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. It is specifically a history of the U.S.'s containment policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist-bloc and its evolution over time.
It begins with U.S. diplomat George Kennan's famous memomorandum or "long telegram" from the Soviet Union which provided the guide for interpreting the intentions of the Soviet that was used by the State Department and the Executive Branch in formulating U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the Communist-bloc nations - especially during the early stages of the Cold War. If a U.S. foreign service officer or other U.S. official wanted to understand the Soviet Union's foreign policy or history and the considerations which would impact the Soviet leadership's behavior - he or she was directed to read it.
The initial assessment by Kennan and his subsequent use of the term "containment" in a Foreign Affairs magazine for the very first time, was controversial and volumes have been written on what he meant.
His approach basically was to advise against a wholesale reordering of the world order based on U.S. values which would cause consternation in the Soviet leadership and trigger Soviet defensive diplomatic (and potentially more drastic measures) in opposing the new international framework.
Kennan wanted diversity in the international system, to allow the Soviet Union to participate within it, and not undermine or be alienated from it, and thus transformed by it over time. The history of the Soviet Union's participation in the UN and its institutions confirms his analysis.
Kennan initially argued for a particularist approach as opposed to a universalist approach. He also argued for strong point as opposed to wide-scale perimeter opposition to expanding Soviet spheres of influence.
Kennan's writings set the stage for an interpretation of Soviet behavior and intentions. He studied Soviet and Russian history and knew that the Soviet Union would seek to build buffer zones between it and any potential adversary. The Napolean invasion, Germany's invasion, etc. as well as the Crimean War, and the Russo-Japanes War of 1905, and the U.S. and European intervention in the Russian civil war, all shaped the Soviet leadership's thinking.
Kennan wanted to restore a balance of power at the interface between the East and West in the European theater as well as in Asia, but without contesting every Soviet move for influence along its borders and without alienating the Soviet Union from the new international order.
Truman subsequently instituted a policy review process that led to NSC-68 which expressly stated that the U.S. policy was to promote U.S. values of freedom and human dignity. Containment then moved into the shape of a perimeter-type defensive strategy in which Soviet moves on its periphery for political and military influence was to be contested.
The book then describes U.S. national security policy and how U.S. containment evolved over time into Eisenhower's "New Look" policy in which no further Soviet expansion of its power into other nations was to be uncontested and then later into "flexible response" under Kennedy and Johnson and then detente under Kissinger.
The book is an excellent introduction to the Cold War, the U.S. policy of containment and its evolution.
Rated by buyers -
Strategies of Containment, by John Lewis Gaddis, is a description of the evolving strategy of containment that was the basis of US policy toward the Soviet Union from 1946 through 1989. Gaddis traces the concept of containment from its inception by George F. Kennan through the modifications applied by five administrations and assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and effectiveness of each version. This book is more than another chronology of the cold war; it provides deep insights into strategic thinking and is essential reading for any serious student of the cold war. Here's a brief summary:
Kennan's Original Doctrine of Containment
* Identify and defend vital interests based on the centers of industrial strength - Britain, Western Europe, Japan -don't try to defend the entire world.
* Use all instruments of power: economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural power as well as military power. Rebuilding the economic vitality of the above areas is a high priority.
* Seek to divide the communist world. Our primary adversary is the Soviet Union. Other communist countries, if not actively supporting Soviet policy, may be led to serve as quasi-allies by depriving the Soviets of their support.
* General war with the Soviets is unlikely, so we can afford to take risks. We can limit our defense spending and not try to defend the world. A point defense of our vital interests is probably adequate.
* Define threats in light of US vital interests, not in terms of Soviet capabilities
Truman and NSC-68
* The policies articulated in NSC-68 moved toward a perimeter defense covering the entire world rather than a point defense of vital interests.
* Primary emphasis was switched to military power and to the entire spectrum of war
* US interests were redefined in response to perceived threats (anything that is threatened must be an interest).
* US strategy became based on a symmetric response to threats - responding in the same time, place, and with the same means as the adversary (e.g., the Korean War).
Eisenhower, Dulles, and the New Look
* Eisenhower's guiding philosophy was that defense is not just defeating the enemy - it is the preservation of our economic and political systems.
* Spending too much on defense could destroy these systems by leading to either inflation or the imposition of autocratic controls. He reduced the defense budget by 33% from Truman's last year and held it at about that level for eight years.
* Alliances relied on allies for ground forces with the US providing Air and Naval support.
* The nuclear threat became the cornerstone of deterrence across the spectrum of conflict - with goal of avoiding war - in belief that any war was all too likely to escalate to nuclear.
* Asymmetric response to threats - response need not be in same place or using same methods as Soviet threat
* Anti-colonial Conundrum: The communists are fomenting wars of national liberation while the US is trying to rebuild Europe (the colonial powers). If the US backs decolonization, it undermines the European allies it is trying to rebuild. If the US backs the colonial powers, it loses any chance of support from the colonies. The Soviets really put us in a no-win position on this issue.
Kennedy, Johnson, and Flexible Response
* Kennedy and Johnson return to NSC-68 reasoning by lowering threat of nuclear response and replaced it with flexible response, requiring a direct, symmetric response to threats - a respond in same time and place using the same means.
* These administrations applied a circular logic: Threats create interests which demand responses which require capabilities even where no interest previously had been identified. This was articulated in the "bear any burden, pay any price" rhetoric.
* This strategy necessitated greater reliance on military response versus economic, political, etc which increased demands on the defense budget.
* Kennedy abandoned Eisenhower's commitment to a balanced budget and relied on Keynesian fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. Spending was predicated on the potential of the economy rather than its actual performance. Lack of budgetary constraints led to inability to prioritize, to distinguish the essential from the peripheral, the feasible from the infeasible which encouraged more "bear any burden, pay and price' reasoning because it wasn't real money.
* Flexible response led to graduated escalation in Viet Nam which became "never enough to defeat the enemy, just enough to prolong the war". Stakes were repeatedly raised to prevent the humiliation of a defeat but this only made the eventual defeat more humiliating.
* Calibrated escalation yielded the initiative to the enemy - allowed him to define the terms of conflict. Deterrence can be made effective only if the adversary can be ... Read More
Rated by buyers -
This book show us the strategies of Containment in the Cold War Era; an important beginning had been made with the Truman Doctrine and the Containment thesis, which established a defensive position holding back Soviet expansionism.
In 1947 the US had an exclusive monopoly on the ultimate weapon, the atomic weapon, and this monopoly should be used -the bomb "makes politically possible....the domination of the world by a single sufficiently large state". The architect of containment was George Frost Kennan, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War.
He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers. The NSC-68, the most important of all Cold War documents, was "a plan of military rearment and development is at present going forward". It's the central document of the Cold War that transformed containment into a global crusade. Approved by Harry Truman in April 1950, it still lacked Congressional funding and support, and Truman was too weak a president to push it throught in the absence of a major crisis.
It would have been interesting if the author of the book had also used an approach from the Soviet point of view, as well as one in the West and the United States. In addition, Henry Kissinger has been widely studied and detailed, but it seems that is not mentioned in the book the figure of the very first Secretary of State of the Nixon presidency, William Rodgers.
Rated by buyers -
Now in a revised edition, Strategies Of Containment: A Critical Appraisal Of American National Security Policy During The Cold War is a revised and expanded edition of Bancroft Prize winner and Cold War expert John Lewis Gaddis' classic on understanding the history of containment as a policy, its role in bringing the Cold War to an end, and its possible value or pitfalls in the future. Originally published during the Regan presidency when the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Strategies Of Containment includes a greatly expanded chapter on Reagan, Gorbachev, and the completion of containment, as well as a new epilogue. A welcome scrutiny of history with the advantage of post-Cold War hindsight.
Rated by buyers 
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This book is still useful even 20 years after publication. Gaddis view US policy toward the USSR as a pendulum that swings between"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" approaches. The periods are split into: Kennan's original containment, NSC-68, Eisenhower's "New Look", JFK and Nixon's détente. There is a coda covering Carter, but it is less helpful.
The symmetrical approach confronts the USSR wherever the USSR chooses to probe. In this approach, wherever the Soviets seek to advance is, by their very actions, a US interest. In contrast, the asymmetrical view seeks to identify those areas that are inherently vital US interests and protect those.
The very first seeks to build a fence (containment) around the Soviets. The second approach builds its fences around US interests and lets the USSR do what it wants - within reason - elsewhere. Heck, why let them do that? The answer is "means." Gaddis stresses the point that US means are not unlimited. The US must balance means and ends and this leads to the pendulum swings.
The reasons I do not give the book the last star are: It does not cover the Carter-Reagan-Bush era and Smith over draws the magnitude of the swings. The book makes it sound like there were tremendous differences between the various administrations and does not pay enough attention to the essential consistency of US Cold War strategy. Smith acknowledges this in a retrospective on his own book available at the Hoover Institute web site.
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