Regular marked price: $24.95Discount Price: $22.49
Cost Savings: $2.46 (10%)Price fluctuation possible.
How soon does it ship: Normal ship time within one day
Shipping? Absolutely FREE if you qualify for Super Saver Shipping.
Type of bind: Paperback
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.7301717
EAN num: 9780198780717
ISBN number: 0198780710
Label: Oxford University Press, USA
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
Quantity: 1
Page Count: 448
Printing Date: July 09, 1998
Publishing house: Oxford University Press, USA
Sale Popularity Level: 57558
Studio: Oxford University Press, USA
Other books you might be interested in perusing:
Editor's Notes and Comments:
Product Description:
Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why did the USSR send missiles to Cuba? What made the Cold War last as long as it did? The end of the Cold War makes it possible, for the very first time, to begin writing its history from a truly international perspective. Based on the latest findings of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, We Now Know provides a vividly written, eye-opening account of the Cold War during the years from the end of World War II to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban missile crisis.
We Now Know stands as a powerful vindication of US policy throughout the period, and as a thought-provoking reassessment of the Cold War by one of its most distinguished historians.
Amazon.com Review:
Was the Cold War inevitable? Was there an international communist conspiracy? Did Castro and Khrushchev beat Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis? After combing through a mass of declassified and previously unavailable documentation to reconsider the collision of the American and Soviet empires, Yale professor Gaddis replies in the affirmative. Given Josef Stalin's convictions, the Cold War was inescapable: it is the choices that each side made that prove fruitful for historical research, and not the mere fact of the war, as Gaddis neatly demonstrates. The American empire--Gaddis's term--prevailed because, he says, 'democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining coalitions,' and not necessarily because of any technological or economic advantage. Gaddis dispels several misconceptions and urges that students of Cold War history should foremost 'retain the capacity to be surprised.'
User popularity level:
Rated by buyers 
-
It's almost impossible to defend dictators who always overstay their historical need, however, we tend to leave out some of the historical facts that may be a part of the problem.
We (USA) sent 15,000 troops into Russia in 1918 to fight the bolsheviks. In addition, Harry Truman authorized overflights of Russia in 1950 using the new Boeing B-47 as a reconnaissance platform. Some histories point out that up to 200 military personnel were lost in these overflights.
I would say that this kind of activity is 'somewhat' provocative and might cause the Russians some concern, particularly in regard to our (USA's) motives AND intentions.
We (the USA) then added the U-2 spy plane into the mix in 1956 and we denied sending this plane over Russian territory. Until, of course, the loss of a U-2 in 1960.
So the Russian Bear really had a dance partner and if the dance partner didn't create the problem, it certainly didn't help to solve the problem and this added to Russia's paranoia!!!!!
JL GADDIS is a house toady. And he teaches at the school that has a long tradition of providing candidates to the Central Intelligence Agency, whose reputation is overstated and whose greatest claim to fame is taking on and SOMETIMES defeating 3rd world countries and governments.
Rated by buyers -
Not much new in this recycled history of the Cold War. Presents the story from the exclusive standpoint of American policy makers.
Rated by buyers 
-
"We Now Know" is Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis' review of the early years of the post-World War II competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This book was very first published in 1997, a few years after the Soviet side of the Cold War had become available to historians in the West. Gaddis and others had previously written from what was known about the West and surmised about the Communists. Gaddis revisits the struggle and fleshes out how actions on both sides drove the course of history.
This is a scholarly volume, written for the graduate student in foreign affairs, with large numbers of footnotes. Nevertheless, the general reader with an interest in the Cold War and the fortitude to persevere through some long stretches of dry material will be richly rewarded with some interesting insights.
Gaddis finds that the personalities of principal communist leaders such as Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao played a disportionate role in determining the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and Communist China, the direct result of a lack of checks and balances in their authoritarian governments. Stalin's paranoid need for security inside and outside Russia, for example, was so great in 1945 that no concessions by the West could have avoided the Cold War. Khrushchev's endeavor to bluff the West on the size of the Soviet strategic deterrent also fooled his allies, contributing to misunderstandings and failed policy. Gaddis assesses that Kim Il-Song of North Korea misled both Stalin and Mao into supporting his invasion of South Korea in 1950.
Gaddis finds that the policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union were to a significant degree shaped by interaction with their respective allies. The willingness of the United States to consult in a meaningful way with its allies was essential to the acceptance of its policies, while the tendency of the Soviet Union to coerce its allies triggered much of the resistance that undermined the Soviet empire. Gaddis' thoughtful analysis of the role of nuclear weapons is especially worthwhile.
"We Now Know" holds up remarkably well against the ten years of additional research available since Gaddis wrote this book. It is highly recommended to students of the Cold War.
Rated by buyers 
-
Gaddis rehashed much of his previously printed material mostly, and consults very little foregin source material, and of course again lays the blame for the Cold War at Stalin's feet. Though this work may provide a decent primer for those beginning to study the Cold War, this work is not going to provide a very fresh look or say much Gaddis hasn't said before... To counter balance Gaddis, take a look at "Cold War Triumphalism" edited by Ellen Schrecker.
Rated by buyers 
-
We Now Know by John Lewis Gaddis is a preliminary reevaluation of the very first half of the Cold War (roughly 1945-62) based on information from the Soviet side that has become available since the demise of the Soviet Union. After presenting a wealth of material, Gaddis offers eight tentative hypotheses:
1. Diversification of power did more to shape the Cold War than did the balance of power. The Soviet Union rivaled the west in military power but lagged significantly in every other dimension, such as economic, cultural, moral, and ideological.
2. Both the US and Soviet Union built empires during the Cold War but they differed significantly. The Western European nations actively sought US support and involvement in the post-WWII years, leading to NATO and the Marshall Plan. In contrast, the Soviet Union had to put down numerous active revolts by members of the Warsaw Pact.
3. Many people did see the Cold War as a contest between good and evil, even if historians rarely did. Thousands of East Germans voted with their feet immediately after WWII, again in the 1950s (leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall), and again in 1989 (when Hungary opened its borders).
4. Democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining coalitions. Gaddis observes that many attributes of a nation's internal politics carry over into its foreign policy. The US was able to maintain its coalition by applying the consensus building techniques used domestically to managing its coalition. The Soviet Union's approach to coalition building, based on its approach to domestic politics, achieved unity within the Warsaw Pact only by smothering dissent.
5. Marxism-Leninism fostered authoritarian romanticism. At the end of WWII, Stalin believed that the subsequent war would be between competing capitalist nations, that the workers of the world would unite, and that all the Soviet Union needed to do was to wait for capitalism to self-destruct. He failed to realize that his aggressive moves into central Europe had united the capitalist nations against him.
6. Nuclear weapons exchanged destructiveness for duration. Nuclear weapons rendered direct military conflict between the US and Soviet Union untenable, even in the years when the US had an overwhelming nuclear superiority. The result was that the Cold War continued unabated until the late 1980s.
7. As long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, the Cold War was inevitable. If one imagines the changes in history that might have resulted from removing one key individual, the only such change that might have prevented the Cold War appears to be the removal of Stalin. His unique position is due to both his absolute power over the Soviet Union and his aggressive policies, exemplified by his moves into central Europe, his encouragement of Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea, and pressure on Mao to intervene when the US/UN forces had defeated the North Koreans. In contrast, removing any one western leader would not have produced any significant change in the course of events.
8. Future Cold War historians should retain the capacity to be surprised. Gaddis modestly observes that his book is not likely to be the final word on the Cold war.
One striking aspects of We Now Know is the description of "Potemkinism" and the impact it had on (1) the Soviet Union, (2) the US, and (3) the Soviet allies. (A Potemkin Village is a façade: An apparently prosperous village consisting of nothing more than building fronts and props built solely to impress the Tsar.) (1) In the face of US military superiority after WWII, the Soviet leadership repeatedly exaggerated its military strength. Waves of bombers flying over the Kremlin in conjunction with parades circled back and flew over again to create the impression of tremendous air power. Khrushchev repeatedly boasted about the superiority of his missiles and nuclear warheads when, in fact, he had very few available. This bluff was designed to deter the US by concealing the actual weakness of the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev failed to anticipate the potential reactions by the US and his allies. (2) In the US, the bluff prompted the "missile gap" debate that figured prominently in the 1960 presidential election and provoked a major effort to "catch up" with the Soviets. The Soviets were then forced to commit more resources to expanding their strategic capabilities in the face of actual American superiority and the arms race was underway. (3) Several Soviet clients also believed the bluff and acted more aggressively because they relied on Soviet military superiority to back them up. This pattern contributed to Kim Il Sung's invasion of South Korea, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and Castro's aggressive stance during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
We Now Know focuses on the very first half of the Cold War, so it is unfair to criticize it for ... Read More
Find other books like this one:
